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Executive Summary  
Comprising England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom’s multi-
national composition has meant that national identity and cultural diversity have been matters 
of considerable historical concern. With devolution for Scotland and Wales, a process has 
been set in motion to accommodate claims to political and cultural self-determination among 
the British constituent nations. Another significant set of ‘diversity challenges’ can be traced 
to the beginnings of labour migration, notably after the Second World War from the 
Caribbean and South Asia. More recently, the arrival of immigrants from Eastern Europe has 
been perceived as both challenging and economically advantageous.  
 
The long-term settlement of groups of immigrant and their descendents marks a salient area of 
diversity challenges. Public debates have emerged. The discussion of what types of difference 
can be accommodated, and how, occurs both nationally, in response to contested issues and 
events, and locally, where schools, councils and non-governmental actors seek to respond to 
the ethnic, cultural and religious mix in the British population. Regarding the national debate, 
cultural diversity is frequently considered to be problematic in relation to cultural identity, 
social order and integration. Locally, claims for non-discrimination in housing, education and 
public life as well as for respectful treatment, in relation to ethno-cultural and, in particular, 
religious claims have been put forward. Yet at both levels, some accommodation has taken 
place within an evolving and strengthened framework of legally enforced anti-discrimination. 
 
The multicultural reality of contemporary Britain has been increasingly taken for granted and 
the presence of post-immigration groups considered a welcome addition to British life. The 
concern is with making Britain a place that acknowledges and celebrates diversity in its 
population and that reconsiders its ‘national story’ to take account of its multicultural reality. 
Non-discrimination, equality, respect and recognition in relation to various dimensions of 
difference have been turned, albeit slowly and not unequivocally, into political commitments. 
Recent years saw such commitments coincide with new attempts to conceptualize an idea of 
‘Britishness’ that identifies a set of shared values while acknowledging the diverse make-up 
of the British population. In line with such concerns and driven by palpable anxieties with 
issues of social disintegration, recent public policies have been designed to provide for a 
sense of ‘community cohesion’.  
 
Against this broad background of practices, political commitments and beliefs, this report 
examines the historical and contemporary dynamic of debates on cultural diversity as causing 
problems but also as a fact that is both irrevocable and positive. It surveys the development of 
claims and grievances, responses from majority society and the mobilization and political 
activism of post-immigration groups with particular emphasis on the South Asian and Black 
Caribbean experience. The report outlines the historical formation of British minorities as 
well as contemporary challenges. What is considered to be a ‘challenge’ does not remain 
constant and thus this report is particularly interested in how the presence of post-immigration 
groups in British society has been considered problematic. For this purpose it retraces public 
debates on cultural difference, contested events, such as the ‘Brixton riots’ of 1981, and 
contestations, such as the mobilization of British Muslims around the publication of Salman 
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in 1988/9. It reviews the scholarly literature on British race relations 
and gives a historical overview of the development of public policy measures. It then 
identifies, drawing on this historical background picture and on contemporary patterns, 
practices, ideas and institutional arrangements of accommodation, tolerance and respect that 
respond to the various diversity challenges that this report identifies. 
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The formation of British post-immigration groups, their particular experiences and the 
development of public policies responding to their presence, can be considered in three broad 
steps.  
 
1) The decades after the arrival of immigrants in the 1950s and 60s was marked by the 
recognition of pervasive structures of discrimination and attitudes of racism. ‘Race Relations’ 
legislation, starting in the mid-1960s, expanded the concern with equality and non-
discrimination. The recognition of wide-spread disadvantage suffered by minorities, however, 
occurred slowly and incrementally. Particularly salient issues in this process were the way in 
which minority populations experienced discrimination in housing and employment and how 
communities were subjected to discriminatory practices by the police. Stop and search (so 
called ‘sus’) laws and procedures meant that in particular black communities were 
disproportionally targeted and often universally suspected. While the rhetoric of equality and 
fairness was easily adopted, deep-seated structures of inequality, such as the institutional 
practices underpinning ‘sus’, were more reluctantly addressed.  
 
The mobilization against ‘sus’ in the 1980s is marked by various outbreaks of urban unrest. 
The murder of the black teenager Stephen Lawrence, and the inadequate police response to 
the crime, further brought the experience of continued discrimination to the attention of a 
wider public. Racism, in coded and institutionally entrenched forms, continued to prevent 
public authorities from delivering an equal service to the members of post-immigration 
communities. The legislative response to the findings of the inquiry into the murder of 
Lawrence, the Macpherson report of 1999, was not least welcomed as it engaged with the 
deeper structures of British racism that had previously been left undisturbed.  
 
2) While the history of British race relations up to the late 1980s was characterized by the 
idea of ‘political blackness’, a shared sense of identity based on colour among the various 
post-immigration groups, events in the 1980s put this notion into question. The demand for a 
kind of equality and public consideration that would take notice of significant differences 
among post-immigration groups was not only put forward but also recognized in various 
flashpoint events. One such flashpoint was the public contestation over Salman Rushdie’s 
book The Satanic Verses, when the political claims of (some) British Muslims for respect and 
recognition on the grounds of their religious beliefs were first acknowledged and debated. On 
the Muslim side it generated an impassioned activism and mobilization on a scale greater than 
any previous national campaign against racism. Many ‘lapsed’ or ‘passive’ Muslims for 
whom hitherto their Muslim background was not particularly important, (re)discovered a new 
community solidarity and public identity. Political blackness—seen up to then as the key 
formation in the politics of post-immigration ethnicity—was seen as irrelevant to an issue 
which many Muslims insisted was fundamental to defining the kind of ‘respect’ appropriate 
to a peaceful multicultural society, that is to say, to the political constitution of ‘difference’ in 
Britain. To some extent this division has since become a defining feature of the politics of 
British multiculturalism. 
 
3) More recent times continue to be characterized by the remnants of this new constellation. 
The events of 9/11 and the suicide attacks of 2005 on London transport have made the 
presence of British Muslims, and the claims for respect that began to be voiced in the 1980s, 
appear increasingly problematic. While significant measures have been designed to counter 
the ‘radicalization’ among this group, the purview of measures designed to further equality 
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and respect has equally been increased, though not unambiguously and not without resistance. 
We note in particular different trajectories charted in the legal system between those 
characterized as racial minorities and those conceived in religious terms. This is something 
that has potentially left Muslims vulnerable because, while discrimination against, for 
example, yarmulke-wearing Jews and turban-wearing Sikhs was deemed to be unlawful racial 
discrimination, Muslims, unlike these other faith communities, are not deemed to be a racial 
or ethnic grouping. Equality in terms of the accommodation of religious beliefs and protection 
against discrimination on grounds of religion is an area where minority grievances – after 
long debates and in a process of tough lobbying – have been heard and codified such as, most 
recently, in the Equality Act 2010.  
 
As one of the fields in which the ‘problematic’ presence of post-immigration groups has been 
thematized, the report considers the issue of ‘racial mixing’. Historically, mixing had been 
captured with the biologist notion of miscegenation and had been a hotspot for the racist 
imagination. In stark contrast, it has become common for policy-makers to celebrate the 
cultural diversity represented by the fact of inter-ethnic partnering and the presence of ‘mixed 
race’ children. Positive reference to Britain as a ‘mongrel nation’ mirrors the way in which 
some of the negative characterizations of the past have been embraced in everyday rhetoric. 
This does not mean, as we illustrate in the report, that the position of ‘mixed heritage’ people 
in Britain has become unproblematic. 
 
The report further considers the prevalent paradigms that have been employed to make sense 
of the claims of post-immigration groups and the politics of cultural diversity in Britain. 
Following the decline of ‘political blackness’ since the 1980s, there are broadly two ways of 
considering the presence of British post-immigration groups, their claims and politics:  
multiculture and multiculturalism. The former emphasizes processes of cultural mixing and 
hybridisation. The latter considers in particular claims for recognition and respect, such as for 
the accommodation of religion in the public sphere. Multiculturalism, as concerned with the 
place and claims of ethno-religious groups, and multiculture, accounting for life, social 
practices and cultural production in urban diasporas, fit loosely and imperfectly to the 
experiences of South Asian and Black Caribbean post-immigration groups. Multiculture 
envisages the re-modeling of majority society’s standards of acceptance in a way that 
inscribes aspects of minority identity into majority culture. Multiculturalism is concerned with 
the reappraisal of difference as a positive fact instead of an unwelcome aberration. Its concern 
is with equal respect and with the need for Britain to adapt its regimes of citizenship, policies 
and laws to recognize cultural pluralism. Its concern is with making Britain hospitable to the 
practices and claims of ethno-religious groups. Multiculture, by contrast, is concerned with 
fashioning a form of equality that affords minority groups a place in the cultural 
representations of the nation. One achievement that has been captured with this paradigm of 
cultural diversity is the abolition of the stigma that was historically directed at ‘mixed race’ 
individuals not merely for their imagined inferiority or ‘problematic’ identities but for how 
they constituted a challenge to classificatory regimes of national belonging.  
 
As was the case with the relative waning of colour racism, historical analysis suggests that 
prejudice, even when it is deeply entrenched, is not beyond change. Such change may be 
driven by the liberalization of new generations’ attitudes. It may also be prompted by new 
visibilities of cultural or religious groups and an appreciation of their place in the broader 
cultural, social and political context of the nation, its narratives and representations. While 
some of the examples highlighted in this report offer considerable hope, the contemporary 
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situation is aggravated by the amalgamation of global anxieties with local concerns. National 
debates continue to be at risk of being taken hostage by the ‘clash of civilization’ thesis and 
security concerns continue to be unhelpfully combined with questions of cultural pluralism.  
 
Summarizing the way contemporary diversity challenges are perceived socially and dealt with 
politically, we can suggest that contravening tendencies are at play and that progress in one 
domain may well coincide with regressive trends in another. Moreover, achievements, such as 
in response to the Macpherson Inquiry, are not irreversible. An increasingly entrenched 
animosity against Islam mobilizes not only fringe groups but animates significant numbers 
within majority society. As illustrated by the changing discourses on ‘racial mixing’, the 
perception of ‘challenges’ has not remained constant. Where, historically, racism on grounds 
of colour has characterized and to some extent continues to characterize the British minority 
experience, new forms of discrimination draw negatively on culture and religion. The political 
responses that are required for making Britain a tolerant and accommodating society, this 
report suggests, need to take account of a moving picture. Recent responses, such as the 
Equality Act of 2010, go some way towards addressing new situations of discrimination. 
Public perceptions of Islam, however, will remain a concern and will continue to be an 
obstacle in the way towards the fair and decent treatment of British Muslims.  
Keywords 
 
Religion; multiculture; multiculturalism; ethno-religious communities; toleration; recognition; 
accommodation; pluralism; diversity; difference; respect; equality; Britain. 
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1. Introduction  
Britain is one of the most diverse societies on the globe. Its colonial legacy, together with 
various migratory movements in the 20
th
 century, has led to an unprecedented diversity of 
ethnicities, cultures and religions in the composition of its population. The most recent census 
counts 4.5 million inhabitants of ‘ethnic minority’ background (for a population of around 59 
million and not counting 700,000 Irish). While the history of immigration, notably from the 
Indian subcontinent and the Caribbean, and the formation of ‘post-immigration groups’ in the 
20
th
 century have been explored variously, recent patterns of immigration are more difficult to 
consider. Estimates for the recent arrival of Eastern European immigrants from the ‘A8’ 
accession countries vary, and the patterns of settlement and work such as of Poles and 
Lithuanians in the UK are insufficiently documented.1 ‘Cultural diversity’ in Britain today is 
thus multifaceted, complex and located in between old and established patterns of post-
immigration diversity and newly emerging patterns of immigration, settlement and cultural 
difference.  
The presence, in particular in Britain’s urban centres, of populations marked by 
unprecedented diversity, has been characterised as a new form of diversity, ‘super diversity’ 
(Vertovec 2007) or ‘hyper diversity’ (Muir and Wetherell 2010). It is suggested that this new 
diversity challenges conventional assumptions about how difference should be 
accommodated. Accordingly, new diversity, such as the presence of people of 179 
nationalities in contemporary London, is seen to imply new challenges that require new and 
fine-tuned political responses. ‘Super diversity’ creates “gaps between policy and practice at 
all levels” (Muir and Wetherell 2010, 9) and, according to Steven Vertovec  (2007, 1027-8), 
challenges an older version of multiculturalism that fails to recognize the increasing 
fragmentation of difference.  
While new constellations of diversity are undoubtedly significant, this picture may be 
incomplete. Demographic differentiation in one urban sphere does not change that significant 
numbers of people, and in particular those who are less visible or interesting as specimen of 
‘old’ kinds of diversity, continue to subscribe to overarching identities that show no sign of 
abating. The Fourth Survey, a large quantitative study of identity patterns of British 
minorities, established the significance of religious identities for British Asians (Modood et 
al. 1997). Such shared experiences of diasporic life continue to shape identities, not least in 
relation to religion, for groups that are ready to mobilize around grievances and common 
claims and in particular when shared value commitments are seen to be under attack. ‘Super 
diversity’, new immigration or the emergence of ‘hybrid’ identities in one domain of British 
life do not discount other, more consolidated and less differentiated, group positions. The 
‘diversity challenges’ that this report explores, are thus both old and new—they arise in 
relation to claims for respect, recognition and equality made by or on behalf of ethno-
religious groups as well as in relation to newly emerging, urban and more individualized 
expressions of cultural diversity.  
For this purpose this report is predominantly concerned with the accommodation and 
more broadly the political negotiation of the difference represented by two British post-
immigration communities, Black-Caribbeans and Asians, in particular British Muslims. Our 
                                                     
1
   Home Office figures for A8 immigrants are generally based on the number of applicants to the ‘Worker 
Registration Scheme’. This data suggests, for example, that 540,000 Polish citizens have been working 
in the UK labour market since 2004, which is very likely to be a serious understimate (Burrell 2009). 
For the recent past, the same data shows a sharp drop of applications such as of more than 50% of 
Polish applicants between 2007 to 2008 (Home Office 2009), likely to be a result of the financial crisis. 
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concern with these two communities allows considering relevant debates on cultural diversity, 
claims for equality and accommodation and policy responses to such claims. In fact, most of 
the currently salient issues and conflicts over equality and cultural diversity can only be 
understood in the historical context of how these communities have made themselves heard 
and of how their claims and politics have been perceived as a ‘challenge’. The mobilization 
for religious equality and for the public accommodation of religion occurs against the 
background of concerns that have been raised and debated since, and even before, the Rushdie 
Affair of 1989/90. Contemporary struggles for racial equality are connected to the historical 
experiences of Black Caribbeans and to the mobilization and protest in response to inequality 
and discrimination, such as the Brixton uprising of 1981. While we do not wish to 
marginalize experiences and issues that do not fit these two narratives, we believe that a 
discussion of the most salient ‘diversity challenges’ of contemporary Britain needs to begin 
with these accounts.  
In the first part of the report we thus prepare the ground for the discussion and introduce 
the historical context of current cultural diversity discourses (2). We offer a brief overview of 
the development of British debates on national identity, of British nationality law and race 
relations legislation. In the second part of the report, we provide an overview of the historical 
presence of the two post-immigration communities we are concerned with, Black-Caribbeans 
and Asians (3). We are particularly interested in moments of political mobilization and when 
claims advanced from minority positions were considered a problem. For the first community, 
Black Carribeans, this means that we are particularly interested in responses to varying 
problemsatisations of their presence in Britain and, in particular, in the stigma of ‘black 
criminality’. In relation to Muslim claims, we consider in particular the mobilization around 
claims and grievances in relation to the accommodation of religion in public life. We then 
proceed to discuss what the British experience of post-immigration diversity implies for ideas 
of acceptance, accommodation, recognition and tolerance and consider the place and 
development of such notions as public values, within law and institutions, and in everyday 
practices (4). We suggest that Britain finds itself in a position where there is the potential for 
post-immigration difference not merely to be tolerated but to be actively and positively 
recognized and respected. Britain shows potential to move beyond a situation where diversity 
is only a negative challenge, requiring toleration, but is turned into a positive experience 
through equality and respect. This, however, remains a potential that for its achievement 
depends on continued effort, political willpower and pressure from below. This report thus 
explores ‘cultural diversity challenges’ with a view to positive opportunities as well as to the 
obstacles and contravening tendencies at hand in contemporary Britain (5). 
2. Great Britain: State formation, national identity and citizenship  
Roy Jenkins, then British home secretary, famously defined integration in 1968 “not as a 
flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, 
in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Jenkins 1967, 267).  Jenkins’ notion of respect for the 
differences represented by post-immigration communities forms a powerful ideal in the 
development of British multiculturalism. As an ideal, it hardly gives a full account of the 
realities of how cultural diversity has been recognized, debated and politically accommodated 
in Britain. It highlights, however, that (some) British policy-makers were ready to 
acknowledge and positively engage with the reality of post-immigration diversity. In view of 
this diversity, Stuart Hall (1999) coined the notion ‘multicultural drift’ which he considers as 
the “unintended outcome of undirected sociological processes” geared towards an increasing 
Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Britain 
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visibility of post-immigration groups.2 In opposition to this drift, mono-cultural and racialized 
conceptions of ‘Britishness’ have been and continue to be articulated and to resonate strongly 
with significant numbers of the British population. Adapting the title of Enoch Powell’s 
infamous 1968 address, the pollster Ipsos Mori, in its ‘Rivers of Blood Survey’, finds that 
roughly 20% of the population admit to racial prejudices whilst significantly higher numbers 
consider immigration and its impact a negative (MORI 2008). While the subsequent parts of 
this report give a more detailed account of the historical formation of ethnic minorities in 
Britain in between those two poles, the ideal of multiculturalism and the ‘spectre’ of 
homogeneous nationhood, this part prepares the ground with some numbers, an excursion into 
aspects of the development of British identity, of British nationality law, race relations 
policies and, finally, theoretical and normative perspectives on cultural diversity in Britain. 
a. Data 
Reflecting the more than 200 languages spoken (CMEB, 2000: 236), the 2001 Census 
revealed that the British population is more ethnically diverse than ever before. Alongside the 
ethnic breakdown the Census shows that there are at least 1.6 million people in the United 
Kingdom who currently describe their religious faith as Islam.  This represents 2.9% of the 
British population, and makes Islam the most populous faith after Christianity (72%); more 
numerous than Hinduism (less than 1%, numbering 559,000), Sikhism (336,000), Judaism 
(267,000) and Buddhism (152,000). Of the Muslim constituency, 42.5% are of Pakistani 
origin, 16.8% of Bangladeshi, 8.5% of Indian, and – most interestingly – 7.5% of other white.  
This is largely taken to mean people of Turkish, Arabic and North-African ethnic origin who 
do not define themselves in racial terms.  It will also however include East European Muslims 
from Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as white Muslims from across Europe. Black-African 
(6.2%), Other Asian (5.8%) and British (4.1%) dominate the remaining categories of ethnic 
identification in the census options.  Even with this heterogeneity, it is still understandable—
if inadequate—that Muslims in Britain are associated first and foremost with a South Asian 
background, especially since they make up roughly 68% of the British Muslim population.        
Britain’s ethnic minority communities are not equally distributed but concentrated in 
England (95.5% as 9% of the population). In 2001, 45% of the ethnic minority population 
resided in Greater London (19% of all residents) and another 8% in region South East of 
London. 13% live in the West Midlands (conurbation of Birmingham), 8% in the North West 
(Liverpool, Lancashire), 7% in Yorkshire and Humberside (Newcastle) and 6.3% in the East 
Midlands, mainly Leicester, where they represent a third of the population. There are 23 
constituencies with an ethnic minority population between 40.5% (Vauxhall) and 66.3% (East 
Harrow) (ONS, 2003). 85% of all refugees and asylum seekers reside in London or the South 
West. Immigrants and ethnic minorities form distinct, recognisable communities. 
British public opinion generally seems appreciative of the fact of cultural diversity 
(MORI 2005), with a majority (77%)  disagreeing with the statement that ‘to be truly British 
you have to be white’, though 18% agree (MORI 2009). Positive attitudes towards diversity 
however do not necessarily translate into support for multiculturalism. This might also be a 
result of the dichotomous framing of issues in public discourse (that is replicated in survey 
questions), such as a contrast between ‘celebrating diverse values’ (27%) and ‘developing a 
shared identity’ (41%) (MORI 2009, 3). What this then shows is a wide-spread appreciation 
of the fact of cultural diversity  and a decline of colour racism that is particularly stark in its 
                                                     
2  Hall (1999) contrasts this drift with the ‘banal’ realities of everyday repression and discrimination, as 
exemplified by ‘sus’ laws (see below). 
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historical dimension (Park et al. 2010). However, this positive spirit does not equally extend 
to a more specific attitudes of respect for concrete manifestations of diversity, such as respect 
for religious identities (Voas and Ling 2010).  
 
Table 1: British population by ethnicity 
 
 
Ethnicity 
 
Number 
 
Born  
Overseas 
 
% of total 
population 
 
% of all ethnic 
minorities 
 
Total 
Population 
 
58.789.194 
 
4.900.000 
 
100 
 
 
 
White 
 
54.153.898 
  
92.4 
 
 
Irish 
 
691.000 
  
1.0 
 
 
All ethnic 
minorities 
 
4.635.296 
  
7.9 
 
 
 
Mixed 
 
677.117 
  
1.15 
 
11.0 
 
All black 
 
1.148.738 
  
1.95 
 
 
Black Caribbean 
 
565.876 
 
238.000 
 
1.0 
 
13.6 
 
Black African 
 
485.277 
 
322.000 
 
0.9 
 
12.9 
 
Black Other 
 
97.585 
  
0.1 
 
1.5 
 
All Asian 
 
2.331.423 
  
3.97 
 
 
Indian 
 
1.053.411 
 
570.000 
 
1.7 
 
21.7 
 
Pakistani 
 
747.285 
 
336.000 
 
1.3 
 
16.7 
 
Bangladeshi 
 
283.063 
 
152.000 
 
0.5 
 
6.1 
 
Chinese 
 
247.403 
 
176.000 
 
0.42 
 
4.2 
 
Other Asian 
 
247.664 
  
0.4 
 
4.7 
 
Other Ethnic 
 
230.615 
  
0.39 
 
7.4 
Source: Census 2001
3
 
b. Britishness 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland came into being in a series of 
treaties between its constituent nations, England and Wales in 1536, with Scotland in 1707 
and with Ireland, thus formalizing its long-standing occupation, in 1801. Not dissimilar to 
other nation states, its creation involved political, administrative and imaginative efforts. Such 
efforts, however, had to take account of the fact of internal diversity, represented by the 
                                                     
3
  The next census is scheduled for 2011 and will be available on http://2011.census.gov.uk/. See 
Appendix 1 for more current though less detailed data on ethnic diversity in England and Wales.  
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United Kingdom’s constituent nations of England, Scotland, Wales and (Northern) Ireland, 
and the legacy of empire.  
Linda Colley (1992) suggests that British national identity, based on a Protestant culture 
and in opposition to Catholicism within and to the Catholic powers on the continent, was 
forged in relation to religious ‘Otherness’ and to the difference represented by the vast 
overseas territories of the colonial empire. Such repertories of identity have been lost along 
with the empire and in line with the declining political salience of Protestant religious 
identification.4 Devolution and the resurgence of national identities in Wales and Scotland 
have further put into question what a source of British identification might be.5 This sense of 
uncertainty about the content of British national identity has recently become the point of 
departure for political attempts to give new meaning to what it means to be British. 
This has been a concern for Gordon Brown (2005; Green Paper 2007) who in numerous 
public statements since 2005 made the case for a new emphasis on ‘Britishness’. The content 
of ‘Britishness’, however, appears somewhat undecided.6 The definition of particularities that 
invite identification seems difficult. Historically, internal diversity had often remained 
unacknowledged (Pocock 1975; Crick 2008) and attributes that were considered British had 
been revealed as mere generalizations of cultural Englishness. Englishness, however, will be 
less than welcome in Scotland and Wales, and a comprehensive set of cultural attributes 
might be perceived as an obstacle in the way of post-immigration communities to subscribe to 
the idea of a national identity.  
c. Citizenship and Immigration Law 
Similar to the difficult negotiation of British identity, British citizenship had to catch up with 
changing conceptualisations of the nation state and with the legacy of the empire. One such 
legacy was the tension between broad principles of citizenship, which with the British 
Nationality Act 1948 granted some 800 million subjects the right to entry and settlement on 
the British Isles, and the growing salience of anti-immigrant sentiment. The 1948 Act created 
the category of ‘Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies’ (CUKC) and encompassed 
all formerly or presently dependent, and now Commonwealth, territories (regardless of 
whether passports were issued by independent or colonial states).  
One outcome was Caribbean immigration as migrants from the Caribbean were invited 
and recruited to assist in post-war reconstruction. During Winston Churchill’s post-war 
Caribbean tour, for example, he famously appealed to Jamaicans to “Come and help rebuild 
your Motherland!” (quoted in Murphy 1989, 88), whilst London Transport and the British 
Hotels and Restaurants Association set up recruiting offices in Barbados (ibid).   
The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act discarded the principle of free entry for 
CUKC persons and introduced work voucher quotas.  It continued to permit free entry only to 
those CUKC whose passports had been issued in Britain and not by a dependent or 
                                                     
4  Even though some commentators highlight how the ‘phantom pains’ of the lost empire continue to 
underpin predominant conceptions of British identity (Gilroy 2004). 
5  Recent survey data points to a relative decline of British national pride and attributes its causes to 
generational change (Tilley and Heath 2007). However, data equally shows that British self-
descriptions, in addition to sub-national identities, persist across the UK and that, by international 
comparison, levels of national pride are fairly strong (Heath and Roberts 2009; Uberoi and McLean 
2009). 
6  Brown (2005) pointed in particular to values of “freedom, responsibility and fairness”. The new 
government with David Cameron has thus far not contributed to the Britishness agenda. This might be a 
result of the intricate tensions that appear to make it easier for a Scottish Labour politician to devise and 
placate Britishness than it would be for an English Tory (Runciman 2010).  
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protectorate territory. Later, the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act restricted the 
unqualified right of British passport holding former dependents to enter the UK whilst the 
1971 Immigration Act implemented a combination of ius soli (citizenship by territory) and ius 
sanguine (citizenship by descent) in order to severely curtail primary Commonwealth 
immigration by establishing a “partiality” clause (or the right to abode) as the legal basis of 
rightful belonging.  Instead of replacing the CUKC with an exclusive definition of British 
citizenship, the Act put Commonwealth immigrants on the same legal footing as other aliens 
whilst prioritising entry from the ‘old Commonwealth’ if people from Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand could demonstrate British lineage (and others such as Anglo-Indians). The 1981 
Nationality Act later withdrew a right to settlement to most Commonwealth citizens.  
 
Table 2: Main Minority and Immigrant Groups in Britain and their Dimensions of Difference 
Dimensions 
of 
difference 
Citizenship Racial Ethnic Religious Cultural Linguistic 
Native minorities 
Welsh      X
7
 
Scots       
Irish       
Immigrants  
Bangladeshis 
 
 X X X X X 
Indians  X X X X X 
 
Pakistanis 
 
 X X X X X 
Black 
Caribbeans 
 X X  X  
 
Africans 
 
X X X X X  
‘A8’ 
Countries 
X    X      X 
Roma 
 
X X X X X X 
 
d. Race-Relations Legislation 
The history of citizenship and immigration law thus shows a transition from imperial 
subjecthood to a ‘normalized’ version of national citizenship, Britain’s racial equality agenda 
                                                     
7
  The most recent survey finds that roughly 22% of all those residing in Wales, about 600,000 people, 
had some knowledge of the Welsh language. 57% of those considered themselves fluent speakers 
(Welsh Language Board 2006). 
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was developed in the context of such restrictions. In the first place, it took some time for 
policy makers to recognize that racial discrimination constituted an embarrassment and a 
normative, political and legal problem.8 In the 1960s, the ‘colour bar’ in British society, the 
widespread and open discrimination on grounds of race was increasingly perceived as a 
problem. The connection to restrictions of immigration rules was, as the Labour politician 
Roy Hattersley MP suggested, that “[w]ithout integration, limitation is inexcusable; without 
limitation, integration is impossible”. The outset of the British racial equality agenda was thus 
conditionally tied to restrictions of immigration.  
There has been legislation in United Kingdom outlawing discrimination on racial 
grounds since the mid-sixties. The Race Relations Act 1965 introduced relatively moderate 
legislation outlawing discrimination, based upon colour, race, nationality (including 
citizenship) or ethnic or national origins, but not on grounds of religion or belief, such as in 
relation to access to premises open to the public such as hotels, bars and restaurants. Three 
years later, and running parallel to the aforementioned Commonwealth Immigration Act 
1968, an additional Race Relations Act (1968) extended protection to employment, housing, 
education and the provision of further goods, facilities and services.  The main legislation 
currently in force is the Race Relations Act 1976, as amended in 2000, which provides 
individuals with the right to bring civil proceedings for discrimination, defines permitted 
‘positive action’9, established the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), and covers all areas 
of employment, education, housing and, more recently, urban planning.  
This legislation was substantially strengthened by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 
2000 after the inquiry into the London Metropolitan Police investigation of the murdered 
black teenager Stephen Lawrence, which extended its scope to cover nearly all functions of 
public authorities (for the first time including the police but still excluding the immigration 
service), simultaneously widening the remit of the statutory duty of public authorities to 
promote race equality. The way in which this Act relates to the longer history of British 
colour racism and, in particular, to the theme of ‘black criminality’ will be one of the 
concerns of the following (see 3.b), as well as the more recent efforts to update the equality 
agenda with the Equalities Act 2010 (3.c). 
e. Multiculture and ethno-religious identities 
There are contending perspectives on cultural diversity in Britain. The ‘super diversity’ theme 
that we have introduced previously points to a fragmentation of difference, as the sheer 
diversity of the various minority groups makes it difficult to lump them together. It contrasts 
with a continued interest in groups, their claims and their political agency. A related tension 
exists between, on one hand, ‘multiculture’ that prioritises practices of mixing and hybridity, 
and, on the other, a perspective that considers and takes seriously claims geared towards the 
preservation of difference.   
‘Multiculture’ has been coined in relation to situations of everyday cultural and ethnic 
diversity, ‘conviviality’ and particularly the Black-Caribbean experience in Britain. It 
captures moments of contact, mixing, cultural exchange and interaction often in, but not 
restricted to, urban settings. It is concerned with the hybridisation of culture and the creation 
of cultural and social spaces that allow for relatively effortless encounters. ‘Multiculture’ is 
                                                     
8  Churchill remarked in this regard that “the laws of this country are well known, and … there is no need 
for new instructions” (quoted in Hiro 1992, 209) 
9  The duty given to public authorities, under section 71(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976, to have ‘due 
regard’ to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination and to promote equality of opportunity and 
‘good relations’ between people from different racial groups.  
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generally not introduced as a programme of social change that would lend itself to 
implementation by policy makers and in public institutions. Paul Gilroy (1995, 4) suggests 
that it is not a “clearly delineated goal or a reified state”; rather, it is something that happens 
in the microcosm of urban life. It consists of the “promise and hetero-cultural dynamism of 
contemporary metropolitan life” (ibid).  
While the history of immigration in the United Kingdom is one of hybridity and cultural 
change, it is equally marked by attempts to maintain ideas and practices, or to change them in 
a way that preserves the core of what is considered valuable. Where the goal of ‘multiculture’ 
is to transcend the mere presence of cultural difference in favour of a hybridization of 
minority and majority culture, the claims of ethno-religious difference are for public spaces 
that allow for, refrain from penalizing, and, ideally, respect the simultaneous assertion of 
claims for difference and inclusion. The goal is to transform the public sphere in order to turn 
negative into positive difference and to allow for the expression of religious beliefs and the 
accommodation of religious practices in the public rather than their confinement in the private 
realm (Modood 2007).  
3. Cultural diversity challenges 
In Britain the distinction between ‘multiculture’ and ethno-religious difference is despite the 
fact that a conventional view had assumed a unity of experience, claims and politics. With the 
fracturing of ‘political blackness’ in the late 1980s and in the course of a new Muslim 
assertiveness dissimilarities between the politics of minority groups became more apparent. 
Such dissimilarities have challenged the idea of a unified politics of multiculturalism and so 
they also challenge a one-size-fits-all type of tolerance.  
This part of the report investigates how both types of differences have been made and 
re-made. It is concerned with moments of correspondence and separation and with coalition-
building and political antagonism. It does not claim that the experience of Black-Caribbeans 
is synonymous with ‘multiculture’ while the claims of British Muslims correspond, in each 
and every case, with the preservation of ethno-religious difference. It does, however, suggest 
that the way British multiculturalism has developed over the last decades makes it reasonable 
to discuss ‘multiculture’ with reference to the Black-Caribbean experience and ethno-
religious diversity with reference to British Muslims.  
We need to take account of the Black-Caribbean presence and the Asian, and in 
particular Muslim, presence in the United Kingdom and of the claims to public 
accommodation and tolerance that have been put forward by members of these groups. The 
discussion is organised along three periods, 1948-1989 (with emphasis on the 1980s), 1989-
2001 and from 2001 onwards. Rather than offering a detailed chronology and an in-depth 
account of post-immigration communities in Britain, it highlights crucial events of political 
mobilization that paved the way for new politicizations of difference, new grievances and new 
claims. Finally, it highlights social practices of ‘racial mixing’ and religious claims-making, 
in particular in the area of public education, and attempts a snapshot of the various responses 
such practices have elicited by majority society. 
a. 1948-1989: The development of post-immigration communities 
The British experience of ‘coloured immigration’ has been seen as an Atlantocentric legacy of 
the slave trade, and policy and legislation were formed in the 1960s in the shadow of the US 
civil rights movement, black power discourse and the inner-city riots in Detroit, Watts and 
elsewhere. It was, therefore, dominated by the idea of ‘race’, more specifically by the idea of 
a black-white dualism.  
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It was also shaped by the imperial legacy, one aspect of which was that all colonials and 
citizens of the Commonwealth were ‘subjects of the Crown’. As such they had rights of entry 
into the UK and entitlement to all the benefits enjoyed by Britons, from NHS treatment to 
social security and the vote. (The right to entry was successively curtailed from 1962 so that, 
while in 1960 Britain was open to the Commonwealth but closed to Europe, twenty years later 
the position was fully reversed.) 
Socio-economically, ethnic minorities entered British society at the bottom. The need in 
Britain was for cheap, unskilled labour to perform those jobs in an expanding economy which 
white people no longer wished to do, and the bulk of the immigration occurred in response to 
this need. Research from the 1960s onwards established quite clearly that non-white people 
had a much worse socio-economic profile than white people and that racial discrimination 
was one of the principal causes.  
Anti-discrimination legislation was introduced in 1965 and strengthened in 1968 and 
1976. While this eliminated the open discrimination that was common up to that time (the 
‘colour bar’), it did not mitigate its various less visible forms. The public appeal of anti-
immigration rhetoric, its emphasis on themes of cultural incompatibility and conflict (Enoch 
Powell’s Rivers of Blood address; Britain, according to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 
being ‘swamped’ by immigrants), did not contribute to an atmosphere of respect towards 
post-immigration communities. In line with anxieties over immigration that were (and are) 
open to be mobilized, the extension of racial equality was connected to restriction of entry: 
“without integration, limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integration is impossible” 
(Roy Hattersley).  
Even though this logic furthered the expansion of rights for those post-immigration 
groups already present, it did nothing to change that the presence of ethnic minorities was 
seen as a problem. Despite the abolition of the open “colour bar”, racism persisted in crude 
and polite forms (Fenton 1999). The history of Britain as an immigration country is thus not 
only one of accommodation and increasing equality for settled communities, but also one of 
the changing ways in which the presence of ethnic minority groups is considered problematic. 
Black Caribbeans 
A symbolic moment in the beginning Black-Caribbean presence was the landing of the S.S. 
Empire Windrush in June 1948 with 491 Jamaicans on board responding to appeals by 
Winston Churchill, amongst others, to come help ‘rebuild the Motherland’. Annual arrivals 
from 1948 to 1952 numbered under 27,550.  For several reasons including the United States 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (1952) (also known as the McCarran-Walter Act) 
curbing Caribbean emigration to the US; economic and political instability accompanying 
immediate decolonization; and the growing threat of immigration legislation in Britain, a 
dominant view arose that prospective immigrants had to leave the Caribbean immediately – 
‘to beat the ban’ (Hiro 1992) - or not at all.  By 1960 annual arrivals rose to 49,650 before 
increasing to 66,300 during the following year. By the time the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act was introduced the number had decreased to 31,800.  Soon after arrivals from 
the Caribbean numbered only 3,241 in 1963, but peaked at 14,848 in 1965 before falling 
rapidly to less than 10,000 in the average year. By 1976 the Caribbean immigrant and post-
immigrant population had reached half a million people. 
Black-Caribbeans arriving in Britain were highly anglicized (Hiro 1992, 19-25). 
Nonetheless, they encountered a hostile environment with ‘No Coloured’ or ‘Europeans only’ 
signs in frequent display. The ‘colour bar’ in British society and widespread attitudes of 
hostility made the early presence of Black-Caribbeans, and their position in employment, 
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housing and public services, marginal and problematic (Collins 2001). The characterization of 
what made their presence problematic, however, changed over time. In line with biological 
racism and powerful cultural conceptions, ‘miscegenation’, racial mixing and inter-ethnic 
partnering, was one such problem account.10 Laziness, drug use, prostitution and disease were 
additional notions applied in public discourse to characterize the Black-Caribbean population 
(Gilroy 2002). The 1970s saw in particular the discovery of ‘black criminality’ (see below).  
The anti-racist mobilization of the 1980s, as well as various outbreaks of urban unrest 
(‘race riots’), was not least in response to the discriminatory exercise of police powers 
towards black people. Conflicts occurred frequently in the proximity of youth clubs, parties, 
reggae festivals and local fairs when police intervened to ‘restore order’. Observing that 
public disorder often broke out around such venues, a memorandum by the London police 
force, the Met, remarked in 1976 with a measure of surprise that  “members of London’s 
West Indian community do appear to share a group consciousness” (quoted in Gilroy 2002, 
118).  
Inspired by the politicisation of black cultural expression and black pride in the United 
States, the quest for self-affirmation and the celebration of black identity occurred in the 
context of a discovery of new types of expression in art, music and literature. Arguably, the 
gradual normalization of the Black-Caribbean presence in Britain is closely connected to the 
development of these cultural forms and to their adoption in majority youth and popular 
culture (Gilroy 2002, 204-5). This route, however, has not been without setbacks and 
contradictions. In particular, the appeal of black culture and the development of hybrid 
cultural forms in black urban Britain did not mean that prejudices vanished, as, for example, 
in relation to how the theme of ‘black criminality’ became a widespread image in the media 
and public representation in the course of the 1970s (Hall et al. 1978).  
Asians 
The British Asian presence in the United Kingdom is a result of labour migration in the 1950s 
and 1960s, of the expulsion of Indians from East Africa in the early 1970s, and of the family 
unification that continued after the restrictions of the late 1960s and up to the mid-1980s. 
While ‘Asian’ refers to South Asian and, in particular, to Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
origins, the label covers a variety of backgrounds. It includes Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims as 
well as a variety of languages or dialects. It entails a variety of local backgrounds that are of 
importance for understanding how patterns of kinship and solidarity impact on political 
mobilization.  
While the majority of Indians is of Punjabi or Gujarati background, some London 
boroughs, in particular Southall, are home to large numbers of Sikhs. Bradford Muslims, for 
example, originate in particular from the Mirpur district of Pakistani Kashmir. Diverse 
patterns of local settlement and the variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds point to 
difficulties with the label ‘Asian’. ‘Political blackness’ as a designator for shared Black and 
Asian experiences came under increasing strain in the course of the 1980s.  
The category ‘Asian’, in turn, encompasses a variety of experiences and position that 
made this label too appear rather loose and increasingly meaningless for an understanding of 
political mobilization among differentiated communities. Majority perceptions of the 
difference represented by Asians and black Caribbeans further served to separate the two. 
                                                     
10  The Notting Hill riots of 1958 were triggered off by white men protesting against the fraternisation of 
black men and white women, and while the first day involved indiscriminate violence against black 
people, it is symptomatic that the second day of violence began with an attack on a Swedish woman, 
Majbritt Morrison, that had been spotted the previous day with her Jamaican husband, Ray Morrison.  
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Michael Banton (1979, 242) captured such changing problematisations of difference in earlier 
decades of the post-immigration presence. 
 
[T]he English seemed to display more hostility towards the West Indians because they sought a greater 
degree of acceptance than the English wished to accord; in more recent times there seemed to have been 
more hostility towards Asians because they are insufficiently inclined to adopt the English ways.  
 
More recently, Pnina Werbner (2004, 899) points to a further, internal differentiation 
that leads her to identify two diasporic spheres of British Asianness: “Whereas Asians are 
perceived to be integrating positively into Britain, contributing a welcome spiciness and 
novelty to British culture, Muslims are regarded as an alienated, problematic minority.” In 
addition, Werbner suggests that the way differences are negotiated within Asian communities 
is muddled and conflictual. Intellectuals and artists within the minority groups challenge 
customs and traditional structures of authority. Their contributions, such as Salman Rushdie’s 
writings or movies like Bend it like Beckham not only give accounts of the negotiation of 
difference in minority groups but are increasingly well received by British majority society.  
This hybrid and, in Werbner’s terms, “impure” sphere of British Asianness contrasts 
with a second sphere of diaspora where differences are preserved and kinship groups continue 
to play a significant role. The average Pakistani in Britain, for instance, feels a sense of not 
only belonging to an extended family but also to a birādari (kinship group) of which a branch 
is in Britain but the centre of which is in Pakistan (Shaw 2000).  
Such patterns and practices, for Pakistanis and other South Asian groups, are neither 
stable nor deterministic of individual behaviour. They do however constitute repertories of 
identification that continue to be meaningful and important for significant numbers of people. 
For British Muslims such differences of kinship groups and the diversity of cultures, 
languages and national backgrounds have meant that a homogeneous version of British Islam 
has not emerged, nor is it likely that it will. Nonetheless, shared belief (as well as the shared 
experience of rejection on grounds of belief) have meant that in recent years Muslim identity 
has become increasingly salient. 
Political Blackness 
While the politics of difference in the United Kingdom underpins various kinds of political 
claims and types of cultural expression, there has been considerable reluctance to 
differentiate. The categories of ‘political blackness’ proceeded from the idea of a shared 
experience of discrimination across ethnic and religious backgrounds. The British population 
was thus divided into two groups, black and white. The former consisted of all those people 
who were potential victims of colour racism, though in both theory and practice they were 
assumed disproportionately to have the characteristics of the African-Caribbean population 
(Modood 1994). Thus a fundamental problem for political blackness came from an internal 
ambivalence, namely whether blackness as a political identity was sufficiently distinct from 
and could mobilize without blackness as an ethnic pride movement of people of African 
descent. This black identity movement, in a growing climate of opinion favourable to identity 
politics of various kinds, was successful in shifting the terms of the debate from colour-blind 
individualistic assimilation to questions about how white British society had to change to 
accommodate new groups.  
But its success in imposing a singular identity upon a diverse ethnic minority population 
was temporary and illusory. What it did was pave the way to a plural ethnic assertiveness, as 
South Asian groups, including Muslims, borrowed the logic of ethnic pride and tried to catch 
up with the success of a newly legitimized black public identity. Indeed, it is best to see this 
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development of racial explicitness and positive blackness as part of a wider socio-political 
climate which is not confined to race and culture or non-white minorities. Feminism, gay 
pride, Quebecois nationalism, and the revival of Scottishness are some prominent examples of 
these new identity movements which have come to be an important feature in many countries, 
especially those in which class politics has declined.  
While anti-racism and political multiculturalism in the period up to the late 1980s 
operated and mobilized with reference to a unified position of ‘political blackness’, this 
position turned out less and less suitable for the actual issues of anti-racist concern. This 
became more apparent in the course of Brixton riots of 1981 and the ‘Honeyford affair’ of 
1986. 
New Cross Fire and Brixton Riots 
We have already suggested that the Black-Caribbean presence in Britain has been associated 
with various and changing types of problems. ‘Miscegenation’ was one such problem account 
that we will return to below. Another one was black criminality. This theme was developed 
and extended in the course of the 1970s (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson et al. 1978; Gilroy 2002, 
Ch. 3). In particular low-level street criminality, mugging, was framed as a quintessentially 
black type of deviance. The police response was to identify ‘high risk’ neighbourhoods in 
which it would come down in a heavy-handed manner, using stop and search laws (so-called 
‘sus’ laws) in a fashion that amounted, frequently, to racial profiling. The insensitivity, if not 
downright racism, of such operations precipitated hostility towards the police.  
While ‘sus’ operations created tensions in a variety of British communities, 1981 saw a 
heightening of such tensions in London. A fire in New Cross, south-east London, that led to 
the death of thirteen black teenagers marked the starting point for remarkable episodes of 
unrest. It is contested whether, in an area known for racist attacks, the fire was deliberately set 
off or the result of an accident. It is clear, however, that the police reacted with insensitivity 
and indifference. The New Cross Fire, or—for those who took it to be arson—the New Cross 
Massacre, became the single largest moment of political mobilization, with 20.000 protestors 
marching through London (Howe 1999). Together with Operation Swamp ‘81, a particularly 
intrusive, heavy handed stop-and-search operation by the London Metropolitan Police (the 
‘Met’) in Brixton, it marked the context of some of the most significant episodes of urban 
unrest in recent British history.  
The Brixton riots of 1981, together with various other episodes of unrest such as in St. 
Pauls (Bristol), Toxteth (Liverpool), Chapeltown (Leeds) and Handsworth (Birmingham) are 
frequently regarded as a turning point in British race-relations as they brought into focus the 
response of newly assertive youth cultures to the experience of racism and deprivation. The 
Brixton unrest became the subject of an inquiry chaired by Lord Scarman. Identifying the 
immediate causes of the riots, the inquiry pointed to “spontaneous act of defiant aggression by 
young men who felt themselves hunted by a hostile police force” (Scarman 1986, 46).  
Controversially for those who subscribed to the notion of ‘high risk neighbourhoods’ to 
justify ‘sus’ operations, it thus took notice of how police operations and discriminatory stop-
and-search practices had prepared the ground for discontent. In its further diagnosis, however, 
Scarman fell short in identifying more fundamental causes for the police conduct: how, 
institutionally, the theme of ‘black criminality’ permeated the Met and made heavy-handed 
and discriminatory policing the natural response to the ‘problematic’ nature of the Black-
Caribbean community (Solomos 1999). The report noted how economic deprivation had 
facilitated the unrest and it advocated a programme of urban renewal that, due to a lack of 
funding, did not yield tangible results.  
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The Honeyford Affair 
An early conflict in which racial equality, ethnicity, and religion came to be combined was 
‘the Honeyford Affair’ (Halstead 1988). Ray Honeyford was headteacher of a Bradford local 
authority school in which the majority of pupils were of Pakistani descent and Muslim. In a 
series of articles in 1983–4 in a national right-wing journal, the Salisbury Review, he argued 
that the education of children such as those in his school was being stifled by the cultural and 
religious practices of their parents. These, he argued, prevented Pakistani ethnicity children, 
especially girls, from becoming proficient in English, participating in the full curriculum (e.g. 
in sport, dance, and drama), from socializing with whites, and from succeeding fully in British 
education and society. He was particularly critical of what he said was the widespread 
practice of Pakistani parents taking or sending their children to Pakistan for weeks or months 
at a time, disregarding the school calendar. These comments—many of which were indeed the 
concerns of educationalists—were presented in an extremely critical, generalizing way that 
portrayed Pakistani working-class culture and aspects of Islam in a negative way and were 
augmented by comments about Pakistan as ‘obstinately backward’, plagued by ‘corruption at 
every level’, and the ‘heroin capital of the world’ (Honeyford 1984). 
The articles were judged as racist by white anti-racists, locally and nationally, and some 
secular Asian activists, who initiated a call for Honeyford’s resignation, which soon came to 
be supported by most of the parents and the leading local Muslim organizations, including the 
Bradford Council of Mosques. The Bradford Pakistani community were agitated by the public 
airing of unflattering comments about them, exacerbated by the distribution of Urdu 
translations of Honeyford’s views by his opponents (Samad 1992, 513).  
These communities, largely from of peasant Kashmiri background, culturally more 
conservative, and influenced by ties of kinship, began to stand up for itself against what it 
perceived to be insults to its culture and to its religious restrictions, especially as they applied 
to gender and sexuality. Leftwing anti-racists therefore came to mobilize alongside 
conservative Pakistanis on the issue of community honour and in due course the alliance was 
successful and Honeyford was pressured into early retirement. The wider and longer-term 
effect of the alliance and of other local developments of the time was to develop the Pakistani 
community, especially the mosque leadership, as a political force in Bradford, at the expense 
of white anti-racists and others rooted in a secular, multi-ethnic coalition, as the former 
considerably outnumbered the latter (Samad 1992).  
The Honeyford Affair suggests that, by the late 1980s, the label of ‘political blackness’ 
had become increasingly unsustainable. Indeed, political blackness was unravelling at a grass-
roots level at the very time that it was becoming hegemonic as a race relations discourse in 
British public life (see Modood 1994).  
b. 1989-2001: New ethnicities, new claims, new politics 
While earlier events had shown cracks in the coalition, subsequent moments of political 
mobilization showed the extent to which claims and grievances of different ethnic minority 
groups in British society developed along different trajectories. In the period from 1989 and 
2001, the Rushdie affair and the murder of Stephen Lawrence are two such moments of 
particular visibility.  
The ‘Rushdie Affair’ 
The single event that most dramatically illustrated the emergence of new forms of ethno-
religious actors—with again Bradford a scene of action, and damaged honour a cause of 
mobilization—was the battle over the novel, The Satanic Verses (SV), that broke out in 1988–
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9, with Muslims protesting its portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad and other revered figures. 
This time the secular anti-racists were virtually absent from the conflict, for while many were 
sensitive to the racial stereotyping and divisions it was causing, they were unhappy that it was 
fuelled by religious anger (Modood 1989). Above all they saw it as a case in which freedom 
of speech should not be compromised, but reluctant to join in the chorus against Muslims they 
mainly kept a low profile.  
On the Muslim side, however, it generated an impassioned activism and mobilization on 
a scale greater than any previous national campaign against racism (Modood 1990; 2005). 
Many ‘lapsed’ or ‘passive’ Muslims (Muslims, especially, the non-religious, for whom 
hitherto their Muslim background was not particularly important) (re)discovered a new 
community solidarity and public identity. This is movingly described by the author Rana 
Kabbani, whose Letter to Christendom begins with a description of herself as ‘a woman who 
had been a sort of underground Muslim before she was forced into the open by the Salman 
Rushdie affair’ (Kabbani 1989, ix).  
What was striking was that when the public rage against Muslims was at its most 
intense, Muslims neither sought nor were offered any special solidarity by any non-white 
minority. It was in fact some white liberal Anglicans that tried to moderate the hostility 
against the angry Muslims, and it was inter-faith forums than political-black organizations 
that tried to create space where Muslims could state their case without being vilified. 
Political blackness—seen up to then as the key formation in the politics of post-
immigration ethnicity—was seen as irrelevant to an issue which many Muslims insisted was 
fundamental to defining the kind of ‘respect’ or ‘civility’ appropriate to a peaceful 
multicultural society, that is to say, to the political constitution of ‘difference’ in Britain 
(Modood 2005). The SV affair, then, divided anti-racists and egalitarians, giving rise to 
organizations like Women Against Fundamentalists, an offshoot of Southall Black Sisters, 
who turned up at Muslim demonstrations to publicly express their support for Rushdie. Other 
egalitarians tried to assimilate Muslim concerns into the equality movement and to some 
extent this division has since become a feature within the broad politics of ‘multiculturalism’ 
in Britain (for an attempt at reconciliation, see Phillips 2007).  
Stephen Lawrence and the Macpherson Inquiry 
On 22 April 1993, a black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, was stabbed to death while waiting 
for the bus in Eltham, South-East London. Even though the attack was visibly racist in 
motivation, the Met operated under the assumption that drug-related violence among 
teenagers had led to the stabbing. The failure to consider evidence that did not accord with the 
foregone conclusion that an altercation among criminals had taken please meant that the five 
suspects were never successfully prosecuted (the testimony of Lawrence’s friend, Duwayne 
Brooks, who had been present during the attack was dismissed).  
The murder of Stephen Lawrence, and the police handling of the inquiry, thus pointed 
to, as Stuart Hall (1999, 189) suggested “how racialized difference is … negotiated at a 
deeper level, where unreconstructed attitudes find a sort of displaced but systematic 
expression in places which the utopian language of ‘multicultural Britain’ cannot reach.” 
Only the efforts of Stephen Lawrence’s parents in pressing for an investigation into the 
murder of their son kept the issue alive in the following years, until the scandal attracted 
attention in the broader public and the mainstream media (Daily Mail).  
An inquiry, commissioned by Home Secretary Jack Straw (promised when Labour were 
in opposition) and chaired by Sir William Macpherson, to investigate the Metropolitan 
Police’s handling of the investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence, detected both 
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“incompetence and racism” (Macpherson 1999, para. 2.11) and noted the “hitherto 
underplayed dissatisfaction and unhappiness of minority ethnic communities […] as to their 
treatment by police” (Macpherson 1999, para 2.15).  
‘Institutional racism’, though no individually attributable racist conduct, were seen to 
prevail in some branches of the police and the report highlighted “the collective failure of an 
organization to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their 
colour, culture or ethnic origin” (Macpherson 1999, para. 6.34). Home Secretary Jack Straw 
promised to make the report a watershed (see McLaughlin and Murji 1999), and introduced 
the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 that imposed a set of obligations on public 
authorities to deal with internal discrimination and institutional racism (Schuster and Solomos 
2004).  
There are continuing concerns about the disproportionate exercise of stop and search 
powers against black and Asian people (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2010).11 
However, the years from Stephen Lawrence’s murder and since the adoption of the Race 
Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 have seen institutional discrimination on grounds of colour 
become an established concern. This has led some commentators, for example Trevor Phillips 
(2009) and John Denham (Department for Communities and Local Government 2009), to 
diagnose the end of racism in Britain. While the last two decades have indeed seen great 
strides forward in combating discrimination on grounds of colour, such statements are blind to 
different forms of racism that do not fit the colour schema.  
Considering black/police relations from Scarman to Macpherson, Stuart Hall pointed to 
processes of “differentiation” among ethnic minority groups. With reference to findings from 
the Fourth Survey (Modood, Berthoud and Lakey 1997), Hall noted that such processes 
undermined the  
 
tired notion of an undifferentiated block of 'ethnic minority' people, homogenously characterized by 
their 'otherness' (Them), versus an equally homogeneous white 'majority' (Us) to whose unified culture 
and 'way of life' the former must assimilate or perish. These fundamentally binary terms in which 
British race relations have been mapped have essentially collapsed. (Hall 1999, 191) 
 
The discontent that had been articulated on the streets of Brixton was, in short, not what 
brought Muslims to the streets of Bradford. While this does not mean that, in principle, 
solidarity between such groups should have been impossible, it highlights that ‘political 
blackness’ did not lend itself as a unifying theme, particularly in light of new types of Muslim 
political mobilization. In a very short space of time ‘Muslim’ became a key political minority 
identity, acknowledged by Right and Left, bigots and the open-minded, the media and the 
government. This politics has meant not just a recognition of a new religious diversity in 
Britain but a new or renewed policy importance for religion.  
c. Since 2001: Cohesion, Equality and Islamophobia 
Turning to contemporary conditions of racial equality and ethno-religious accommodation, 
various forces seem to be at play. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 revealed a 
strong commitment on the part of the Labour government to extend and consolidate the field 
of racial equality. This commitment coincided with a new accentuation of civic commonality 
                                                     
11  In fact, the most recent data for 2008/9 shows persistent inequities and, in fact, a significant 
deterioration in the way towards stop and search ‘equity’. Nationwide, black people are seven times 
more likely, and Asian two times, to be stopped and searched. Avon and Somerset, where  black people 
are 9.1 more likely to be stopped and searched, is at the top of the league (Ministry of Justice 2010; 
Travis 2010). 
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and shared lives, a priority that was reflected in the turn towards the concept of ‘community 
cohesion’. In the summer of 2001 various episodes of unrest in the north of England, and the 
involvement of young British Muslims in this violence, were generally seen as a case for how 
previous strategies of multicultural accommodation had led to separateness and segregation. 
This was then diagnosed as a root cause of unrest, an explanation that could be extended to 
cover, in 2005, the bombing of London buses and underground services.  
Community Cohesion and the ‘Civic Turn’ 
In the summer of 2001 after civil unrest and 'rioting' that had taken place in some northern 
towns, home to both a small and large number of Muslims, David Blunkett (2001, 3) stated 
that 'one of this government's central aims is to achieve a society that celebrates its ethnic 
diversity and cultural richness; where there is respect for all, regardless of race, colour or 
creed'. In the same statement he gave notice of Home Office-funded teams which would 
'undertake an urgent review over the summer of all relevant community issues' (Blunkett, 
2001, 3). A contemporaneous local Bradford report set the pattern for official questioning of 
multiculturalism by arguing that particular communities, widely understood as Muslim 
communities, were self-segregating (Ouseley Report, 2001), an alleged tendency that was 
described in another report as the phenomenon of leading 'parallel lives' (Cantle, 2001). 
In charging Muslim communities with self-segregating and adopting isolationist 
practices under a pretence of multiculturalism (for an analysis see Hussain and Bagguley, 
2005), these reports pioneered an approach found in other post-riot accounts, and which 
provided many influential commentators with the licence, not necessarily supported by the 
specific substance of each report, to critique Muslim distinctiveness in particular and 
multiculturalism in general. This has given rise to discourses of 'community cohesion' and a 
greater emphasis upon the civic aspects of integration, which have increasingly competed and 
sought to 're-balance' the recognition of diversity in previous discourse and policy (Meer and 
Modood 2009). 
It is also important to understand, however, that in contrast to the ‘civic turn’ in much of 
North West Europe, the original interest in civic matters in Britain was not stirred by Muslim 
political claims-making.  For following New Labour’s general election victory in 1997 a 
range of key actors, including politicians, pundits, academics, think-tanks and pressure 
groups, become increasingly concerned about a range of different problems, of which civic 
integration/participation was only one, but which mapped neatly onto the concerns of then 
salient social capital theorists such as Putnam with issues around trust, norms and networks 
(Kisby 2006).  
These perceived problems included concerns about a ‘democratic deficit’ and low voter 
turnout and, in particular, about civic and political disengagement and cynicism among young 
people. And it is for this reason that citizenship was revived as an educational issue.  What 
needs to be understood is that issues of Muslim integration initially came to rest in this mould 
before the mould would be later re-cast.  Thus when the term ‘community cohesion’ enters 
the lexicon, following an inquiry into civil unrest or ‘rioting’ in some Muslim areas in the 
North of England, the commissioners conceive it as encompassing a ‘domain of social capital’ 
which facilitates ‘people [to] feel connected to their co-residents’ (Cantle 2001, 74). 
Equality and Non-discrimination 
We note the different trajectories charted in the legal system between those characterized as 
racial minorities and those conceived in religious terms. This is something that has potentially 
left Muslims vulnerable because, while discrimination against yarmulke-wearing Jews and 
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turban-wearing Sikhs was deemed to be unlawful racial discrimination, Muslims, unlike these 
other faith communities, are not deemed to be a racial or ethnic grouping. Nor are they 
protected by the legislation against religious discrimination that did exist in one part of the 
UK: being explicitly designed to protect Catholics, it covers only Northern Ireland.  
Similarly, incitement to religious hatred was unlawful only in Northern Ireland, while 
the offence of incitement to racial hatred, which extended protection to certain forms of anti-
Jewish literature, did not apply to anti-Muslim literature. Many years after this complaint was 
first raised, the hand of the British government was forced by Article 13 of the EU 
Amsterdam Treaty (1999), which issued the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations of 2003 which made discrimination on the grounds of religious belief illegal in 
the labour market, but fell short of demands for a wider social protection against incitement to 
religious hatred. 
Of course while the directive was issued by the EC, it has been argued that it’s 
provenance in British and Dutch models such that “in effect, the British framework has been 
‘uploaded’ to EU level” (Geddes and Guiraudon 2008, 129). Indeed, it was not only the 
British but also some variation of the Dutch model, both of which are “linked to a network of 
actors including NGOs and academic activists with good links to European institutions, 
particularly the Commission and the Parliament” (ibid. 133). The Anglo-Dutch led Starting 
Line Group (SLG), although never present at actual negotiating tables, is illustrative of the 
way in which tested practises from British and Dutch contexts could be marshalled and 
mobilised to influence “the content of legislation because they had been fed into the 
Commission policy development process”. 
This in Britain was, however, only a partial ‘catching-up’ with the existing anti-
discrimination provisions in relation to race and gender. While religious discrimination was 
extended to cover the provision of goods and services in 2007, there was no duty upon the 
public sector to take proactive steps to promote religious equality as was created in respect of 
racial equality by the Race Relations Act (Amendment) Act 2000 and as also existed in 
relation to gender and disability, till the Equalities Act (2010). After considerable lobbying 
the government extended the public duty to include religion and belief and this was eventually 
included in this legislation that the recent Equalities and Human Rights Commission has been 
created to monitor. 
As yet there is no prospect of religious equality catching up with the importance that 
employers and other organizations give to sex or race. A potentially significant victory, 
however, was made when the government agreed to include a religion question in the 2001 
Census. This was the first time this question had been included since the inception of the 
Census in 1851 and was largely unpopular outside the politically active religionists, among 
whom Muslims were foremost. Nevertheless, it has the potential to pave the way for 
widespread ‘religious monitoring’ in the way that the inclusion of an ethnic question in 1991 
had led to the more routine use of ‘ethnic monitoring’.  
In sum, then, while original legal approach to anti-discrimination in Britain was the 
statutory tort of unlawful discrimination (created by the SDA 1975 and RRA 1976),  
subsequent developments, especially through European developments, have meant that this 
‘public function’ of discrimination law has become more explicit (Malik 2007). Moreover, 
UK discrimination law has come to accommodate some of the provisions of the ECHR 
through the Human Rights Act (1998).  
These developments have led to what is sometimes described as the ‘constitutionalising’ 
of discrimination law. In other words the incorporation of the ECHR through the HRA has 
proven to be catalyst in shaping recent changes to anti-discrimination measures. This is 
perhaps most evident in the decision to name the commission entrusted with the task of 
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monitoring the implementation and practice of all previous anti-discrimination legislation, as 
well as the two most recent EC Directives, as an Equality and Human Rights Commission and 
the move to recognize ‘intersectionality’ as a legitimate ‘ground’ in itself (Meer 2010). Most 
significantly, the new legislative developments have, on the one hand, created a duty of multi-
faceted equality in the public sector, and on the other hand, included religion. Whilst the latter 
involved the utilisation of an EU directive, it has gone much further than the EU required. 
Hence, in less than a decade, mainly under pressure from a Muslim lobby, the UK 
government has moved from denying the existence of religious discrimination to the strongest 
legislation on the offence in Europe.  
d. Issues and Practices of Cultural Difference: ‘Mixing’ 
Theoretical and political perspectives on multiculture and ethno-religious diversity need to 
take account of the complexities and ambiguities that characterize most social phenomena. 
Where the former parts of the report have offered an events-based account of Black-
Caribbean and Asian post-immigration communities, this part highlights social practices of 
‘mixing’.  
Phenomena of ‘mixed race’ have been a hotspot for the racist imagination (Bauman 
1990). British history gives ample evidence for how such phenomena are perceived as 
challenges to racially constituted boundaries and, as such, trigger rejection and aggression.12 
The extent to which (British) racism had defined itself in relation to the dangers of  
‘miscegenation’ and ‘race crossing’ makes it all the more noteworthy how recent positions 
and debates appear to have moved. Inter-ethnic partnerships or the presence of ‘mixed race’ 
children as such are not particularly noteworthy and certainly do not provoke the level of 
resentment or paternalistic anxiety that marked the response of majority society just a few 
decades ago (Wilson 1987; Tizard and Phoenix 1993). Notions of racial purity are confined to 
the racist fringes, where, for example, the British National Party (BNP) offers a type of New 
Right ideology that rejects ‘mixing’ in order to “preserve the rich tapestry of mankind” (BNP 
n.d.).  
In contrast, it is much more common for policy-makers to celebrate the cultural 
diversity represented by the fact of inter-ethnic partnering and the presence of ‘mixed race’ 
children. Positive reference to Britain as a ‘mongrel nation’ mirrors the way in which some of 
the negative characterizations of the past have been embraced in everyday rhetoric (Christian 
2000). Trevor Phillips, head of the EHRC, recently suggested that the increasing number of 
inter-ethnic partnerships and ‘mixed heritage’ children represented a fundamental and positive 
transformation: “make way for the British Obama generation” (Phillips 2009).13 
Clearly, the positive discourse of racial diversity does not capture the various ways in 
which a problem perspective on ‘mixing’ persists, often wrapped in paternalistic talk of 
‘identity crises’, and in which ‘mixed race’ individuals experience disadvantage.14 In fact, 
socio-economic marginalization continues to characterize the experience of significant parts 
of ‘mixed race’ groups. Moreover, racist violence towards ‘miscegenation’ still occurs,15 and 
                                                     
12  ‘Miscegenation’ played a significant role in triggering wide-spread riots in British port cities in 1919 as 
well as in the Notting Hill riots of 1959 (see Fn. 8). 
13  Phillips responded to a report commissioned by the EHRC that highlighted, in particular, increasing 
numbers of inter-ethnic relationships (Platt 2009). 
14  The 2008/9 British Crime Survey points out that the risk for adults with a mixed background to become 
victim of a crime is, at 35%, significantly higher than for those with an Asian (26%) or white (23%) 
background.  
15  Among them in 2005 the murder of a Liverpool teenager, Anthony Walker, who had been seen to be 
holding hands with his white girlfriend. 
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parents of mixed-race children continue to encounter difficulties. A recent study by Harman 
(2010) points to difficulties for mothers of mixed-heritage children in their own families 
(mirrored in the overrepresentation of children of 'mixed' background on child protection 
registers, see Owen and Statham 2009). Tikly, Caballero et al. (2004) highlight how bullying 
that centres on the dual heritage of children is relatively widespread in schools and how 
curricula, schools’ policies and teachers’ practices are not always adequate to cater for the 
needs of ‘mixed race’ children. This all points to the caveat that the policy discourse of 
celebrating ‘mixing’ may not capture the variety of experiences of people from ‘mixed’ 
backgrounds.  
There is evidence of this variety in particular across ethnic and class backgrounds. 
White/black Caribbean children experience similar measures of socio-economic disadvantage 
as their black Caribbean peers (Song 2010). As regards educational attainment there are 
differential rates for white/black Caribbean, white/black African, white/Asian compared to the 
white average. Whilst the achievements of the first group are, on average, lower, the second 
obtains similar grades to their white peers and the third, on average, performs better. The 
recent report of the National Equality Panel (NEP 2010, 76-8) confirms this picture but also 
highlights, among other factors (not least: gender), the role of religion as a statistical variable 
in educational attainment (Burgess et al. 2009) and employment disadvantage (Khattab 2009). 
Generally, religion also appears as one factor that complicates the story of uniformly 
increasing rates of inter-ethnic relationship. For some groups, such as Muslims of Pakistani 
background but also Indian Sikhs, co-religionist preferences coincides with relatively high 
rates of religious affiliation (Platt 2009). The different significance attached to marriage is 
another feature that accounts for varying rates of inter-ethnic partnering across ethno-religious 
groups (Berthoud 2005). Accordingly, whilst inter-ethnic partnering has become wide-spread 
among Black-Caribbeans, patterns for other groups point much more towards preservation 
and homogamy, with less than 10 percent of inter-ethnic partnerships for men and women of 
Bangladeshi or Pakistani descent (Platt 2009, 42-3). There is thus no uniform movement 
towards ‘mixing’ and, in particular, the interactions between race, ethnicity, religion and 
socio-economic status are important but also difficult to account for and to disaggregate for 
their role in explaining such trends.  
In line with such complexities, it is also difficult to draw more than loose connections 
between the occurrence and visibility of ‘mixing’ and the prevalence of racist stereotypes. 
Clearly, however, one significant insight has to be that ‘mixed race’ children face less 
discrimination than only a few decades ago and that inter-ethnic partnering has been gradually 
normalized. The British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) that collected data on attitudes 
towards ethnic minority spouses and ethnic minority bosses shows a striking trend of 
generational change (Ford 2008, 612-2). The rates of change and the relatively uneven 
participation of British post-immigration communities in the process of ‘mixing’ and 
partnering are, one may suggest, a footnote to attitudinal changes that, over the last decades, 
comprise all ethnic minority groups, though to varying degrees (Muttarak and Heath 2010).  
Do the increasing prevalence of and the changing attitudes towards ethnic mixing then 
present themselves as an example of the types of “intermixture that appear to have evolved 
spontaneously and organically from … the ordinary multiculture of the postcolonial 
metropolis” (Gilroy 2004, 136)? It is no doubt problematic to cite complex social phenomena, 
such as the various dimensions and meanings of ‘mixing’, in support of rather abstract 
theories. It seems, however, that the gradual normalization of ethnic mixing in Britain is 
indeed connected to encounters that took place outside of the purview of official multicultural 
politics. The relationship between ‘mixing’, conceived as ‘transgressive’ and as a challenge to 
understandings of homogeneous nationhood, and the decline of previously pervasive 
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categories of colour racism is difficult to trace and substantiate. It seems reasonable, however, 
to assume that members of majority society that are inducted into cultural framework that is 
thoroughly multicultural in advertisement, music and the arts develop dispositions that 
attribute less significance to racial boundaries.16  
4. Definitions of respect and recognition in Great Britain 
With regard to claims advanced by post-immigration groups, we have pointed out some of the 
dissimilarities. Diverse experiences and social locations underpin particular concerns, 
responses to different experiences of stigmatization and different ideals of equality and 
respect. Beyond the practical specificity of this variation, we suggest that there are two broad 
versions of claims and that accommodation may take two basic forms, equal dignity and equal 
respect (Taylor 1994; Modood 2007).  
Equal dignity requires the abolition of discriminatory laws and the incorporation of 
individuals despite their differences into a horizon of universal rights. Equal respect by 
contrast suggests that identity markers are considered for the value they represent to their 
bearers and that because of such differences law and policy need to respond differentially to 
the nature of the difference at stake. Where equal dignity has not been achieved, this is more 
often than not a question of the inadequate application of principles of equality and non-
discrimination. This, however, is not the case with some of the most contested demands for 
equal respect that are advanced in contemporary Britain. Here political debates often 
showcase fundamental disagreement over the respect and recognition that is due to ethno-
religious communities in the public sphere.  
Recent debates on cultural difference in Britain have tended to pit the two varieties of 
claims and the ‘two kinds of difference’ against each other in a binary manner. Various 
theorists have over the last two decades contrasted multiculturalism with multiculture, 
suggesting their practical irreconcilability and a necessary antagonism (e.g., Waldron 1996; 
Gilroy 2000). While to us such binary oppositions appear unnecessary (Modood and 
Dobbernack 2010), we need to recognize that a regime that unites equal dignity with equal 
respect requires considerable fine-tuning and will inevitably raise conflicts and 
misunderstandings. 
Britain is undoubtedly a forerunner with regard to the two domains. There has been a 
quicker recognition than, say, in Germany that post-immigration groups were here to stay; a 
greater readiness than in France to make symbolic representations of the nation and the 
national story hospitable to difference; and a greater concern with equality and greater respect 
for differences than what has been achieved in comparable immigration countries. The 
following thematizes the achievements of the British case in relation to the horizon of public 
values that are present and discernible in British discourses on difference, as an institutional 
arrangement and in social practices. Such achievements, it may be worth restating, are neither 
unambiguous, nor irreversible. They should be seen as potentials that depend for their 
achievement on continued political effort, such as the pressure from minority groups and 
political actors’ willpower. 
                                                     
16   Which would be a simple application of Gordon Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis. Ethnographic 
research, however, points to more complex processes that are highly variable according to where inter-
ethnic contact occurs and how it is mediated. This is, for example, what Coretta Phillips (2008) points 
to in a study of inter-ethnic relations in British young offenders institutions or Anoop Nayak (2003) in a 
study of ethnicity and inter-ethnic contact in British youth subcultures. 
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Values of the British regime of accommodation  
Roy Jenkins, we have noted in the beginning of the report, conceived of integration 'not as a 
flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in 
an atmosphere of mutual tolerance' (Jenkins 1967, 267). A value horizon of what 
accommodation, ideally, should be about was thus formulated early on: it includes equality in 
a situation where partaking in the benefits of equal political and social citizenship would not 
require immigrants or their descendents to abandon cultural or religious attributes. We have 
suggested that this idea remains a powerful principle that despite problems in its 
implementation constitutes an ideal of British multicultural acceptance. 
The accommodation of difference by means of equal respect, what Jenkins pointed to as 
the legitimacy of “cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance”, has not been 
uncontested. It had to go against the idea of homogeneous white, protestant nationhood that 
Linda Colley (1992) points to as the past ferment of Britishness. In fact, as official discourse 
is ready to ‘celebrate diversity’, homogeneity continues to exert a pull such as when the space 
for religious difference is disputed or when economic crises reanimate racialized self-
conceptions. The Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB 
2000) highlighted how ‘rethinking the national story’, as the commission put it, was a 
necessity to open a space for post-immigration groups to find a place. This attempt to rethink 
Britain is not without ambiguities and continues to be marred by uncertainties as illustrated by 
Gordon Brown’s recent attempt to formulate a more tangible notion of Britishness (Brown 
2005).  
Policies and institutional arrangements  
We have pointed to the successive consolidation and institutionalization of racial equality 
since the 1970s. It is arguably not merely a desire for standards of racial equity that 
underpinned this development. The agenda was partially driven, on the centre-left, by the 
guilty conscience of policy-makers wanting to compensate for increasingly restrictive 
immigration rules and, on the right, by the desire to countervail racist unrest. 
In its early days as well as in its more contemporary development, the broadening of 
the equality agenda is characterized by successive ‘discoveries’ of problems of inequality, 
invariably in response to minority mobilization. The ‘colour bar’, the openly racist 
discrimination in the labour market, including the public sector, and open racism in housing 
and social services, were first ‘discovered’ as a scandal in the 1960s and early 1970 and the 
first Race Relations Acts were thus intended to put an end to openly racist discrimination.  
The insufficiencies of these first responses and the continued presence of an 
underbelly of racism were again revealed and thematized such as in the uprisings in Brixton 
and elsewhere. A more engaged response to the persistence of racism thus had to take account 
of more subtle stigmatizations of post-immigration groups, such as of the (more or less) coded 
representations of black criminality that Stuart Hall (1978) brought out.  
The mobilization against ‘sus’ in the 1980s is thus in line with the scandalizing of the 
police response to the murder of Stephen Lawrence in the 1990s. Racism, in coded and 
institutionally entrenched forms, made public authorities adopt racist practices and prevent 
them from delivering an equal service to the members of post-immigration communities. The 
new legislative response to the Macpherson inquiry was not least welcomed as it engaged 
with the deeper structures of British racism that had previously been left undisturbed.  
Equality in terms of the accommodation of religious beliefs and protection against 
discrimination on grounds of religion is, as mentioned above, another area where minority 
grievances – after long debates and in a process of tough lobbying – have been heard and 
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codified such as, most recently, in the Equality Act 2010. Opening a place in British 
education for non-Christian faith schools or allowing for Muslim curriculum objectives are 
further challenges that continue to be politically contentious (Meer 2007). 
As regards the political process, the adoption of equality measures rarely proceeded 
without pressure from below. Minority agency in various forms, through public protests, 
advocacy groups or party-political channels, played an indispensable role. The most recent 
elections showed for example that the British Muslim electorate, though politically 
heterogeneous and difficult to mobilize en bloc, was considered a force to be reckoned with 
and candidates from all three major parties went to lengths to vow Muslim constituents 
(Chapman and Versi 2010).  
Acceptance and accommodation as social practice. 
There is hardly an unambiguously discernible picture of the values that are embodied in the 
relations between British minorities and majority groups on a variety of social levels. While 
this report has pointed to differences among post-immigration groups, ‘majority’ is an equally 
unwieldy denominator that potentially conceals the diversity of interactions between 
minorities and different strata of majority society. With regard to ‘racial mixing’ we have 
suggested that this differentiation is highly significant. Differential everyday experiences of 
diversity need to be considered as well as the way in which various socio-economic groups 
may have different experience of the post-immigration groups and individuals they encounter.  
In a different matter, the problematisation of ‘mixing’, with its long-standing history in 
the theme of miscegenation, has not been displaced but at least amended by the official theme 
of celebrated diversity. British diversity is in fact often presented as an ‘asset’, as was 
particularly discernible in the early years of the Labour government of the late 1990s or in the 
more recent run-up to the London Olympics 2012. Cultural diversity as an asset is however at 
least partially counterbalanced by the rhetoric on immigration that tends to present outsiders 
as a threat to British economic well-being. The previous Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who 
was not above giving voice to such resentments – ‘British jobs for British workers’ (cited in 
Summers 2009) –, experienced a backlash just before the May 2010 election when his 
remarks on the ‘bigotry’ of a staunch Labour supporter were accidentally recorded and 
subsequently made public. While immigration and asylum thus continue to be noxious 
political issues, such debates do not necessarily tarnish the more wide-spread appreciation of 
the fact of cultural diversity in Britain (MORI 2005; 2009).  
Conceivably, the increasing acceptability of cultural racism and in particular of 
Islamophobic resentment may tarnish this picture, even though the significance of ‘culture 
versus colour’ in British racism is contested. Robert Ford (2008) uses the British Social 
Attitudes (BSA) survey to advance a broader claim on the relative insignificance of cultural 
attributes. Other data, not least in the most recent BSA survey of 2010 (Voas and Ling 2010), 
appears to challenge his account (which still works with the unwieldy and imprecise category 
of  ‘Asians’) in particular in relation to Muslims.  
There is thus considerable evidence of how everyday interaction across ethnic and 
cultural lines is more common and less remarkable than it used to be, say, two decades ago. 
There are practices of conviviality that are certainly difficult to capture with a view to how 
majorities tolerate minority practices. Rather we need to take notice of how in such processes 
of everyday exchange, as suggested by Paul Gilroy and Stuart Hall, culturally hybrid forms 
emerge and spread. The claims for respect and recognition that British Muslims put forward, 
too, are not predominantly about tolerance but for the public recognition and accommodation 
of religious belief.  
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5. Conclusion 
Summary analyses of the British response to post-immigration difference run into difficulties. 
In fact, on the basis of the above we can suggest that contravening tendencies are at play and 
that progress in one domain may well coincide with regressive trends in another. Moreover, 
achievements, such as in response to the Macpherson Inquiry, are not irreversible (Younge 
2009). An increasingly entrenched animosity against Islam mobilizes not only fringe groups 
but animates significant numbers within majority society (Bleich 2009). At the same time, the 
Equality Act 2010 points to the readiness to engage with the claims and positions of minority 
groups and to further develop the British agenda of multicultural accommodation.  
Various scenarios are thus conceivable. The approach that was taken in relation to other 
types of differences could be carried forward and extended to ethno-religious groups; 
however, a second and equally conceivable path may involve a break from the better 
traditions of British multiculturalism and the rejection of identities and claims of British 
Muslims and other ethno-religious groups as impossible to accommodate. While there is the 
potential to ‘rethink the national story’ and to establish a kind of multicultural citizenship that 
has equality and respect written into it, there is equally the potential for regression even going 
back and beyond the norms of a more minimalist modus vivendi towards ethno-national 
parochialism. 
As was the case with the relative waning of colour racism, historical analysis suggests 
that prejudice, even when it is deeply entrenched, is not beyond change. Such change may be 
driven by the liberalization of new generations’ attitudes. It may also be prompted by new 
visibilities of cultural or religious groups and an appreciation of their place in the broader 
cultural, social and political context of the nation, its narratives and representations. While 
some of the examples highlighted in this report offer considerable hope, the contemporary 
situation is aggravated by the amalgamation of global anxieties with local concerns. National 
debates continue to be at risk of being taken hostage by the ‘clash of civilization’ thesis and 
security concerns continue to be unhelpfully combined with questions of cultural pluralism 
(Huntington 1992; Prins and Salisbury 2008).  
British cultural pluralism has been positively captured by two different approaches. 
Multiculturalism, as concerned with the place and claims of ethno-religious groups, and 
multiculture, accounting for life, social practices and cultural production in urban diasporas, 
fit loosely and imperfectly to the experiences of South Asian and Black Caribbean post-
immigration groups. Multiculture envisages the re-modelling of majority society’s standards 
of acceptance in a way that inscribes aspects of minority identity into majority culture. 
Multiculturalism is concerned with the reappraisal of difference as a positive fact instead of 
an unwelcome aberration. Its concern is with equal respect and with the need for Britain to 
adapt its regimes of citizenship, policies and laws to recognize cultural pluralism. In particular 
the focus is on making Britain hospitable to the practices and claims of ethno-religious 
groups. Multiculture, by contrast, is concerned with fashioning a form of equality that affords 
minority groups a place in the cultural representations of the nation. One of its achievements, 
we have suggested, was the abolition of the stigma that was historically directed at ‘mixed 
race’ individuals not merely for their imagined inferiority or ‘problematic’ identities but for 
how they constituted a challenge to classificatory regimes of national belonging.  
The demands of both for public accommodation are discernible in the various claims 
and grievances of post-immigration groups. On the whole, British policy-making has been 
responsive to such claims and law and policies have been adapted to make space for various 
post-immigration differences, though this has been not without contradictions and 
countervailing tendencies. This report then suggests that there is the potential in Britain to 
further forms of respect, equality and multicultural recognition. 
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What this report could not fully investigate is a further area of critical questions 
regarding toleration and respect. These are not merely thrown up in the relationship of 
minority and majority groups. They extend further to how different forms of difference can be 
brought together, coexist and acknowledge each others’ legitimacy. For Britain, this is the 
challenge facing multiculturalism and multiculture, as the two paradigms that have frequently 
put in opposition, rather than allowing for a meaningful relationship and a ‘conversation 
across differences’ (Modood and Dobbernack 2010). Too often this conversation is barred as 
the modalities of one are imposed on the other. Among contemporary cultural diversity 
challenges in Britain thus numbers the challenge to recognize that the reality of post-
immigration groups requires a pluralized normative and conceptual vocabulary that makes 
space for coexistence and respect between two ‘kinds’ of difference.  
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Appendix 
 
Population of England and Wales by ethnicity – Source: Office for National Statistics 2007 
 
Ethnicity 
 
Number 
 
 
 
% of total 
population 
 
 
 
All Groups 54.072.000 
 
100 
 
 
 
White British 45.559.900 
 
84.3 
 
 
 
White: Irish 586.000 
 
1.1 
 
 
White: Other 
White 1.830.600 
 
3.4 
 
Mixed: White 
and Black 
Caribbean 290.600 
 
0.5 
 
Mixed: White 
and Black 
African 117.600 
 
0.2 
 
Mixed: White 
and Asian 268.000 
 
0.5 
 
 
Mixed: Other 
Mixed 217.600 
 
0.4 
 
 
Asian or Asian 
British: Indian 1.329.600 
 
2.5 
 
Asian or Asian 
British: 
Pakistani 916.700 
 
1.7 
 
Asian or Asian 
British: 
Bangladeshi 360.400 
 
0.7 
 
Asian or Asian 
British: Other 
Asian 344.100 
 
0.6 
 
Black or Black 
British: Black 
Caribbean 602.900 
 
1.1 
 
Black or Black 
British: Black 
African 736.600 
 
1.4 
 
Black or Black 
British: Other 
Black 118.500 
 
0.2 
 
Chinese or 
Other Ethnic 
Group: Chinese 408.800 
 
0.8 
 
Chinese or 
Other Ethnic 
Group: Other 384.100 
 
0.7 
 
  
 
